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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Households  
in Kota Pekalongan  
 
Asri Yusrina and Akhmadi 
 
 
This study adds to the studies about the impact of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) on 
Indonesia’s economy both at the macro- and microeconomic levels. Kota (City of) 
Pekalongan was chosen because of the facts that the city is a Community-Based Monitoring 
System (CBMS) area in Indonesia and that there is household-level data available in the city. 
 
The data analysis at the macroeconomic level was intended to find the occurrence of GFC and 
how it was transmitted to the city. Qualitative data collection through focus group discussions 
and in-depth interviews enrich the macroeconomic analysis. By combining data from the 2009 
CBMS census and the GFC impact survey in five kelurahani, the study aims to identify which 
household group was the most affected. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is used to 
predict which households belong to which quintile of household welfare in each kelurahan. 
 
The fall of prices of commodities, particularly cotton, and the depreciation of the Indonesian rupiah 
were the shocks of the GFC that significantly appeared at the macroeconomic level and were 
transmitted to the city’s batik home industry, which later affected the households. There were also 
other local shocks that contributed to the GFC resulting in compound crises felt by the households. 
 
The affected households are those that had a household member that switched jobs, even to a 
worse one, and experienced an income decline during June 2008−June 2009. Based on the 
household welfare quintile, the majority of the affected households come from the poorest 
household group (the first quintile). The poorest households, particularly the affected ones, 
reduced their food consumption, used the Health Insurance for the Poor, and had children 
(10−18) who dropped out of school during the crises and started work. 
 
The provision of well-targeted social protection programs such as the Health Insurance for 
the Poor and Unconditional Cash Transfer 2009 (BLT 2009) programs helped the poor to 
cope with the compound crises. In Kota Pekalongan, the poor households benefited from the 
programs when they lost their financial ability during the crises. In times of crisis, the 
government should also provide incentives for industries that are vulnerable to external 
shocks and that many households rely on as a source of income. 
 
In anticipation of future crises, a good database of targeted households and vulnerable industries will 
enable the government to create an effective early response system and take prompt action. Other 
than the database provided by the central government, databases initiated by the local governments, 
such as the household data from the CBMS project in Kota Pekalongan, can be of great benefit. 
 
Keywords: CBMS, global financial crisis, Kota Pekalongan, impact 
                                                          
iA kelurahan is a village-level administrative area located in an urban center. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The financial crisis that hit the United States (US) in mid-2008 had affected and spread all over 
the world, including to many European and Asian countries. The effect of this financial crisis 
was felt in numerous countries through the interconnectedness of the global economy in trade, 
finance, and investment. However, each country experienced a different level of impact 
depending on their economic structure and economic integration with the rest of the world’s 
economies. The reaction from the affected countries also differs based on their policy responses. 
 
Despite the countries’ differences in impact and responses, the assumption of the 
transmission mechanism of the global financial crisis (GFC) to those affected countries is 
somewhat similar. With the credit crunches and borrowing-constrained households, the 
demand of the US economy for foreign products declined. Like other developing countries, 
Indonesia started to experience the impact of GFC in the last quarter of 2008. The impact was 
transmitted through the weakened export demand, fallen commodity and oil prices, and 
currency depreciation. Although—as a country that is dependent on imported oil—Indonesia 
should have been able to benefit from the downward trend in the oil price, it was unable to do 
so due to the rupiah depreciation. 
 
As an economic entity, Indonesia consists of 33 provinces and 497 districts/cities with each 
region giving a different contribution and entailing a different economic sector. Despite the 
economic downturn that could be observed through the macroeconomic data at the national 
level, the regions experienced different levels of the GFC impact. The comparative advantage 
of a region determines how the GFC impact was transmitted. 
 
Other than being one of the Community-Based Monitoring System (CBMS) locations in 
Indonesia, Kota Pekalongan is also important to be included in the GFC impact analysis due 
to the existence of manufacturing industries in the city that contributed around 20,87% of the 
country’s gross regional domestic product (GRDP) and 25% of the exports value in 2008.1 
Based on interviews with local officials of the Association of Indonesian Handicraft Producers 
and Exporters (ASEPHI), these officials highlighted some potential effects of the GFC in 
Kota Pekalongan.2 They stated that export had declined by 30% since mid-2008 and that it 
had dropped by 60% by the end of December 2008. In February 2009, only 20% of the 
products were exported, but by May 2009, the figure increased to 40%. 
 
The proceeding sections of this paper are organized as follows. Section 2 presents several 
literature reviews on the global financial crisis at the macro- and microeconomic levels. 
Section 3 explains the impact of the GFC on Indonesia’s macroeconomy. Section 4 describes 
to what extent the GFC had an impact on microeconomic conditions with regard to the 
households in the selected kelurahan3 in Kota Pekalongan. Section 5 explains the coping 
mechanisms adopted by the households in response to the shocks. Section 6 provides 
information about mitigating strategies in the form of policy responses with regard to the 
impact of the GFC. 
                                                          
1Authors’ calculation from the 2009 Statistics Indonesia (Badan Pusat Statistik) data and the 2009 Export 
Realization data by Kota Pekalongan’s Agency for Industry, Trade, Cooperatives, and Small- and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises (SMEs), or Dinas Perindustrian, Perdagangan, Koperasi, Usaha Mikro, Kecil, dan Menengah Kota 
Pekalongan. 
2Only temporary declining value. 
3A kelurahan is a village-level administrative area located in an urban center. 
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II. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
 
 
When the GFC emerged, the Government of Indonesia (GoI) had estimated its transmission 
channels and impact on the economy (Murniningtyas, 2009). The predicted transmitted 
impacts were: 
 reduced exports of commodities such as oil, crude palm oil, and other cash crops; textiles 
and garments; and craft and furniture—especially to the US, European Union, and Japan; 
 weaker domestic production, especially in labor-intensive industries (indicators included 
reduced output of these industries, reduced production capacity at industrial estates in Java, 
and decreased exports from exporting manufacturers, resulting in decreased output and 
lower capacity utilization rates, estimated to have fallen from 76% in 2008 to 70%  in 2009); 
and 
 dismissals and lay-offs, as well as the return of overseas workers. 
These are predicted to have an effect on the increasing numbers of people below the poverty 
line. 
 
Based on a regional economic study conducted by Bank Indonesia (2008) about the impact of 
the GFC on Central Java Province, the dominant industries that were heavily affected by the 
crisis were the export-oriented industries such as textile and furniture industries. Since Kota 
Pekalongan is located in Central Java Province, the study gives a valuable insight about an 
indication of which industrial sector was affected by the GFC. The study predicted that the 
export volume would be stagnant until 2009, while the prices of export commodities would 
decline. The prices of import commodities used as raw material would increase due to the 
depreciation of the rupiah, despite the falls of prices of the world’s commodities. 
 
As others have predicted, The SMERU Research Institute (2009a), in its observation on 
various mass media, found that the manufacturing sector had also been affected by the GFC, 
with some industries suffering more than the others. The textile, footwear, electronics, and 
automotive industries were the worst affected. They had been forced to cut back on 
productions and eventually on work hours as well as the number of staff. The food and 
beverages industries as well as the cigarette industry, on the other hand, were the least 
affected. A number of handicraft-making industries which commonly export their products to 
some American and European countries have also suffered from reduced demands. 
Companies have attempted to gradually lessen the negative impact of the crisis by reducing 
their staff hours; discontinuing contract workers, who are mostly employed by labor 
outsourcing companies; no longer recruiting new employees; and downsizing their staff. 
 
Regarding the effect of financial instability and the transmission of crisis at the 
microeconomic level, which later affected the households, Tennant (2009) explained that the 
business sector dealt with them by adopting some strategies such as (i) reducing the use of 
imported inputs, sourcing from alternative markets, or accessing new sources of finance; (ii) 
reducing non-staff expenses and expenses incurred by the usage of local inputs which 
transferred to a third party (home or small industry) with which the business interacts; and (iii) 
closing the business, laying off workers, and reducing the staff’s wage and benefits. 
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Based on the immediateness of the impact on households, option (i) has the minimum impact 
and option (ii) has the medium impact in which the linkage is indirect to households. Option 
(iii) has the immediate impact on households’ welfare with many of them losing their source 
of income. 
 
A comprehensive study by The SMERU Research Institute and the Institute of Development 
Studies gives further analysis of the impact of the global financial crisis at the household level 
(McCulloh and Grover, 2010). In addition to the impact of the crisis on the employment 
sector, the study also explains about the impact of the crisis on food and fuel prices which 
directly affect households’ well-being. Based on their qualitative findings, the GFC began to 
be felt in the export-oriented sector. In the case of Desa Gandasari, Jakarta, migrant workers 
working in this sector had already started to lose their jobs and returned home by November 
2008. Thus, more changes were found with respect to the internal migrants. However, while 
internal migrant remittances continued to decline, the crisis was also pushing many into trying 
internal migration as a coping strategy. Workers in the informal sector and the self-employed 
were also affected by the global financial crisis although with various intensities. 
 
Owing to the food and fuel crisis, instead of the GFC, the study finds that households were 
unable to compensate for the rise in food prices. Women and children were forced to diversify 
into new activities, often at a considerable cost to their time and status, or at some risk. 
However, the impact on children—their education and the likelihood that they would go into 
labor early—varied, depending on the severity of the impact on household finances, material 
support available for school-going children, attitudes towards education, and the availability of 
children’s work. Apart from the possible changes in their children’s education, households 
also use several coping strategies in terms of food consumption and healthcare patterns. 
 
Findings of the studies above give us background information about the possible impact of 
the GFC and other shocks at the macro- and microeconomic levels—throughout the country, 
regions, economic sectors, and households—as well as the coping mechanism adopted by 
actors at each level. Regarding these issues, we would like to explore the possibilities in the 
Kota Pekalongan context. This study begins with the analysis of how the GFC was transferred 
and had affected the macroeconomic data at the national level as well as in the city, followed 
by an analysis of the city’s affected economic sector. 
 
 
 
III. MACRO IMPACTS 
 
 
Since the collapse of major financial institutions in the US in mid-September 2008, official 
data from Statistics Indonesia shows that the Indonesian economy experienced a slower 
growth starting at the beginning of the fourth quarter of 2008. Sectors that experienced the 
slowest growth were the manufacturing and trade/hotel/restaurant sectors (Table 1). While 
the growth rate of the manufacturing sector had dropped more than 50% in the fourth quarter 
of 2008 (year-on-year, or YoY), the slowdown in the trade/hotel/restaurant sector’s growth 
rate was moderate. However, the demand in the manufacturing sector remained positive since 
it was sustained by the domestic demand. The trade/hotel/restaurant sector’s growth rate had 
worsened at the beginning of 2009. The growth rate was even negative in the following 
quarter. This was likely due to the decline in foreign tourists’ financial ability regardless of 
rupiah depreciation. 
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Table 1. Year-on-Year GDPa Growth in Indonesia, 2008 and 2009 
Industrial Origin 
2008 2009 
I II III IV I II III 
Agriculture 6.3 4.8 3.4 4.7 4.8 2.4 2.7 
Mining and quarrying -1.7 -0.5 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.4 6.5 
Manufacturing 4.3 4.2 4.3 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.3 
Electricity, gas, and clean water 12.3 11.8 10.4 9.3 11.4 15.4 14.6 
Construction 8 8.1 7.6 5.7 6.3 6.4 8.8 
Trade, hotel, and restaurant 6.9 8.1 8.4 5.6 0.6 -0.1 -0.6 
Transport and communication 18.3 17.3 15.5 15.8 16.7 17.5 18.2 
Finance, renting, and business service 8.3 8.7 8.6 7.4 6.3 5.5 4.9 
Other services 5.9 6.7 7.2 6 6.8 7.4 5.8 
GDP growth rate 6.2 6.4 6.4 5.2 4.4 4 4.2 
Source: Bank Indonesia, 2008; and Badan Pusat Statistik, 2009. 
a
GDP = gross domestic product.  
 
Table 2 shows that in the third quarter of 2008, the growth of Indonesia’s export and import 
was still positive, as the impact of the GFC had not yet occurred. Investment was at a growth 
rate of 12.2% compared to the same period of the preceding year, while the exchange rate was 
Rp9,331 against the US dollar, which was moving upward relatively above the average level of 
the current year. However, households experienced a high inflation growth (13.5%) due to the 
risen food and oil prices (McCulloh and Grover, 2010). 
 
When households were able to adjust to the risen food prices, at the end of the first quarter of 
2009, inflation rate was lower than that at the same period of the previous year. In regard to 
the trade balance, the growth of the export and import of goods in the first quarter of 2009 
dropped considerably compared to their growth in the previous year’s corresponding period. 
Both of them were affected by the volatility of the exchange rate, which was about Rp11,517 
against the US dollar. Investment fell to 3.5% due to the crowding out of foreign investment. 
 
Indonesia’s macroeconomic condition began to stable in the third quarter of 2009; people 
benefited from the low inflation rate. However, there was a large decline in export compared 
to the same period in 2008, presumably caused by the broadening of the GFC impact 
experienced by developed countries outside the US. 
 
Table 2. Macroeconomic Indicators for Indonesia Before, During, and After the GFC (%) 
YoY Growth (%) 3
rd
 Quarter 2008 1
st
 Quarter 2009 3
rd 
Quarter 2009 
GDP 6.4 4.4 4.2 
Inflation 13.5
a
 8.48
a
 2.83
a
 
Export 10.6 -19.1 -22.3
b
 
Import 11 -24.1 -30.84
b
 
Exchange rate (IDR/USD) 9,331 11,517 9,633 
Investment 12.2 3.5 4 
Source: Badan Pusat Statistik and The World Bank in McCulloh and Grover, 2010. 
a
Inflation figures are YoY figures for the end of the last month of each quarter. 
b
January–October 2009 over January–October 2008.  
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However, macroeconomic data from Kota Pekalongan shows a slightly lower growth with the 
GRDP rate in 2008 0.07% lower than that in 2007 (the GRDP rates are not presented in the 
quarterly changes due to data limitation) (Table 3). It means that the city’s production slightly 
decreased compared to the previous year. 
 
Based on the GRDP growth rate figures, in 2008, the manufacturing industry had a growth 
slowdown, the trend of which was similar to that of the national data. Other sectors except 
the trade, hotel, and restaurant sector also went through a slowdown. The agricultural sector 
faced a negative growth although the negative growth in 2008 slightly decreased compared to 
the percentage of negative growth in 2007. As an indication of the GFC impact, the 
manufacturing industry still faced a low growth in 2009 when the GRDP growth had 
increased throughout the year. 
 
Table 3. Gross Regional Domestic Product of Kota Pekalongan at Constant 2000 
Market Prices by Industrial Origin, 2007−2009 (Billion Rupiah) 
Industrial Origin 2007 
Growth 
Rate 
(%) 
2008 
Growth 
Rate 
(%) 
2009
a
 
Growth 
Rate 
(%) 
Agriculture 183.00 -7.08 171.59 -6.24 165.75 -3.52 
Mining and quarrying 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Manufacturing industry 382.47 4.48 394.04 3.02 402.37 2.07 
Electricity, gas, and clean water 20.89 6.62 21.64 3.61 22.18 2.43 
Construction 229.65 6.93 241.43 5.13 259.54 6.98 
Trade, hotel, and restaurant 477.19 3.68 512.14 7.32 529.32 3.25 
Transport and communication 189.79 5.85 193.74 2.08 207.24 6.51 
Finance, renting, and business service 129.66 6.91 133.85 3.23 138.28 3.20 
Other services 207.34 6.22 219.43 5.83 242.07 9.35 
GRDP 1,820.00  1,887.85  1,966.75  
GRDP growth rate (%)  3.80  3.73  4.01 
Source: Badan Pusat Statistik, 2009. 
a
Estimate figures. 
 
Table 4 shows the number of manufacturing industries based on their classification and scale. 
The data will help us to understand the manufacturing sector’s contribution to the economy 
of Kota Pekalongan. Based on the scale, Kota Pekalongan is dominated by small-scale 
industries with investment values less than Rp200 million, such as home industries, employing 
numbers of laborers. The textile industry, including the batik industry, is part of the varied 
industries, along with the rubber and wood industries. The agricultural product industry 
includes the fishing industry and its products. 
 
Regardless of the various industries in Kota Pekalongan, only several industries contribute to the 
city’s exports value. Data shows that the fishing industry and its products contributed about 50% 
of Kota Pekalongan’s exports value throughout January–November 2009 (Dinas Perindustrian, 
Perdagangan, Koperasi, dan Usaha Mikro, Kecil, dan Menengah, 2009). During the same period, 
the batik industry contributed about 25% of the city’s exports value (approximately US$5 million). 
The remaining 25% was contributed by the sarong industry and other garment industries.  
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Table 4. Characteristics of Industries in Kota Pekalongan 
Classification of Industries 
Based on Investment Values 
Numbers of Establishments Numbers of Employees 
2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 
Metal Machine and Chemistry Industries 
 A Large -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 B Medium 9 10 11 449 495 379 
  C Small 321 322 325 1,211 1,216 1,244 
Varied Industries 
 A Large 3 3 3 1,216 1,216 1,216 
 B Medium 31 32 32 2,907 3,792 3,017 
  C Small 1,290 1,302 1,332 16,535 16,634 17,172 
Agriculture Product Industries 
 A Large 1 1 1 137 137 137 
 B Medium 14 15 16 3,694 3,792 3,803 
  C Small 1,233 1,237 1,240 6,012 5,951 5,964 
Source: Dinas Perindustrian, Perdagangan, Koperasi, dan Usaha Mikro, Kecil, dan Menengah Kota Pekalongan in Badan 
Pusat Statistik Kota Pekalongan, 2010. 
Note: The classification of the industries is based on the investment value: 
a) Large = investment value > Rp5 billion, 
b) Medium = investment value between Rp200 million−Rp5 billion, and 
c) Small = investment value < Rp200 million. 
 
Based on the data presented, we can conclude that the industrial sector in Kota Pekalongan is 
characterized by several dominant industries, namely the fishing and batik industries, which 
are distributed numerously among small-scale industries. The existence of small-scale 
industries is vastly related with the households’ livelihood since most of the industries are 
located in neighborhood units (rukun tetangga, or RT) and employ informal workers from the 
surrounding area.   
 
Looking at the slowdown of Kota Pekalongan’s economy shown by the GRDP growth rate, it 
is possible that the community felt some shocks through some channels that related to the 
city’s economic sector, that is, the textile and fishing industries. To enrich the analysis, we 
include what happened to Kota Pekalongan’s overseas workers during the GFC. 
 
 
3.1 Impact on the Economic Sector: Textile/Batik Industries 
 
Since the GRDP shows that there was a slowdown in the manufacturing industry’s growth, we 
assumed that there were two channels of how the impact of the GFC was transmitted to the 
textile industry and then to the households in Kota Pekalongan. The first channel is through 
factories that reduced their input to cope with the weakened demand. An interview with the 
local Labor and Transmigration Agency states that a company named ‘Tobal Batik’, which 
regularly received orders from the US, had reduced their staff from 400 workers to 50 workers 
during 2008−2010. 
 
There was also a closing of a garment factory that was caused by the mismanagement of the 
family business. It was said that the workers of this factory had been laid off gradually during 
2007−2010 and that the workers had received some compensation. The impact of the closing 
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was therefore not immediate and the former workers were able to cope with it with the 
compensation they received. 
 
The second channel assumed to have had an impact on the households was through the batik 
industry. Although the share of the batik industry in the national GDP is relatively steady, which is 
about 9% per year, the Ministry of Trade stated that the exports value of Indonesia’s batik during 
2004−2008 was in a positive trend, even though it weakened in 2005. In 2004, the exports value of 
the batik industry was US$34.2 million and became US$12.43 million in 2005. The export of batik 
increased in 2006 with a value of about US$14.26 million, increasing to US$20.87 million in 2007 
and US$32.27 million in 2008. The trend weakened again during January−November 2009 with an 
exports value of US$17.35 million, as the targeted countries for Indonesia’s batik export such as 
the US were in financial crisis. Based on a rough estimation, the batik industry in Kota Pekalongan 
contributed about 29% of Indonesia’s batik exports value during January−November 2009 
(Kementerian Perdagangan in PT Viva Media Baru, 2009). 
 
Kota Pekalongan is one of the two major batik producers, besides Kota Cirebon, in the island of 
Java. The batik industry in Kota Pekalongan is typically not in the scale of a large factory. There 
are wholesalers that take major contracts of producing batik, but instead of producing it, they 
subcontract the demand to several home industries to produce the batik. These wholesalers 
provide white fabric (mori cloth) to the home industries that will then dye it in batik patterns. 
These home industries are paid for each square meter of patterned batik produced. In Kota 
Pekalongan, the batik industry is a labor-intensive industry where the batik is handmade. 
 
The qualitative analysis reveals that the impact of the GFC in this city was mostly felt by the 
households through the hike in the cotton price in the batik industry. As explained in the 
related literature section, in reality, the GFC had caused the prices of commodities to decrease 
due to the converse shift of their supply and demand in the international trade as a result of 
the exchange rate hikes. The result was that the textile industry suffered because of the higher 
commodity values since most of their raw materials are imported. 
 
 
Figure 1. Cotton and crude oil prices and currency levels (IDR/USD) on a monthly 
basis, 2007−2010 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the data from www.indexmundi.com and www.bi.go.id.  
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Figure 1 shows that during January 2007–July 2008, the crude oil price increased; this was 
recognized as a food and oil crisis, whose effect also contributed to the upcoming shocks felt 
by the households. As the GFC impact started to be felt in Indonesia, between October 2008 
and January 2009 (3rd and 4th quarters of 2008 and 1st quarter of 2009), the crude oil price, as 
well as the cotton price, fell sharply. On the contrary, the exchange rate increased and reached 
a peak at Rp11,700−Rp11,900. 
 
The increasing price of imported cotton had increased the price of mori cloth produced by the 
textile industry. The batik industry heavily depends on mori cloth to make batik. The higher 
price of mori cloth meant a higher cost spent on producing batik. Wholesalers that provided 
mori cloth to home industries had to cut down on their cost. They did it by reducing the home 
industries’ payment for producing batik patterns per square meter of fabric. These home 
industries were not in a strong bargaining position and thus could not do anything but to take 
the offer. 
 
In the making process, the batik also uses some chemical colorants and batik wax the prices of 
which had also increased since the rupiah had depreciated. The focus group discussion with 
the community in Kota Pekalongan revealed that, at the beginning of 2009, the price of 
chemical colorants escalated to Rp33,000 per kg from about Rp25,000 per kg in the previous 
year. The price of wax used in the dyeing process of batik had increased from Rp15,000 per kg 
in 2008 to Rp25,000 per kg in 2009. To minimize their burden, home industries reduced the 
number of workers or the workers’s payment. Since most of the workers in home industries 
are casual workers, the choice was either looking for another source of income or accepting 
the offered lower payment. Thus, the increasing price of cotton, namely due to the GFC, 
contributed to the shocks felt by the households. 
 
The crisis was compounded by Indonesia’s stiff competition against China in the export of 
batik. An interview with an official from the Labor and Transmigration Agency of Kota 
Pekalongan revealed that during 2008−2009, the local batik merchandize was in fierce 
competition in price and market share with Chinese batik. The city’s producers of batik cloth 
(raw product) to batik shirts and skirts (finished products) faced shocks caused by the 
competition. 
 
Indications of the GFC, through weakened exports of textile and batik demands and increases 
in the cotton price, as well as the local crises (the closing of factories due to mismanagement 
and shocks caused by fierce competition) were potential shocks that created compound crises 
felt by the households. 
 
 
3.2 Impact on the Fisheries Industries 
 
The SMERU Research Institute (2009b) stated on their media monitoring update that 
Indonesia’s fishery exports fell immediately when demand from the US fell 30%–40% during 
the 2008/2009 GFC. The US is the main market for Indonesia’s fishery exports and takes, on 
average, 40% of the total national exports. Since the fishing industry of Kota Pekalongan 
contributes to approximately 50% of the city’s exports value, weakened export demand means 
a lower amount of fish that would be bought by wholesalers. However, the quantitative and 
qualitative analyses conducted in Kota Pekalongan do not reveal how households felt the 
impact of the GFC through the fishing industry. 
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Some interviews with the households revealed the closing of the only local fishers’ trading place 
located north of Kota Pekalongan. Due to the closing of a local ice factory, local fishers could 
not buy ice that they use to freeze fish they catch. The fishers sold their catch on transactions at 
sea; they did not sell their fish on land. Therefore, the local fishers trading place was deserted 
from any transaction and it eventually closed down. It was said that the closing of the fish 
trading place had affected households that relied their source of income on several activities at 
the fish trading place as, for example, fishing deck hands and small resellers of fish. 
 
Weakened export demands for fishery commodities due to the GFC and the closing of the 
local fish trading place were additional shocks that contributed to the compound crises that 
transmitted through the textile and batik industries and had impacts on the households.  
 
 
3.3 Impact in the Return of Overseas Workers 
 
There are assumptions that the GFC also affected overseas workers that worked in the 
industrial sector and that they were laid off due to the weakened export demands. The 
SMERU Research Institute (2009c) stated that the economic sectors in South Korea and 
Malaysia that were affected were the automotive, textile, and electronic injection industries. 
The companies managed the GFC’s impact through reductions in the numbers of working 
days and hours. Even if layoffs were experienced by the overseas workers, they did not 
immediately return home; they sought work in other companies. On the other hand, the 
impact of the GFC was not particularly felt by Indonesian women migrant workers that were 
employed as domestic workers. 
 
When the issue was brought to attention of the Labor and Transmigration Agency of Kota 
Pekalongan, they informed that most of the overseas workers from Kota Pekalongan work as 
domestic workers rather than industrial laborers. Therefore, it is very likely that their return was 
not caused by the GFC. The country destination for most of the overseas workers from Kota 
Pekalongan is Saudi Arabia. The agency also advised that the overseas workers that are registered 
with private recruitment agencies located in the city are not only local residents but also workers 
from Kabupaten (District of) Pekalongan, which is a fringe area of Kota Pekalongan. 
 
 
Figure 2. Incidences of returning overseas workers of Kota Pekalongan 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the National Agency for the Placement and Protection of Indonesian 
Migrant Workers (BNP2TKI) data.  
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Figure 2 shows the number of overseas workers from Kota Pekalongan that returned to 
Indonesia on a monthly basis throughout 2008−2010. In 2008, the highest return rate of 
overseas workers occurred in September. The percentage decreased in the following months. 
 
Other than the monthly return rate of overseas workers throughout 2008−2010, the National 
Agency for the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers (BNP2TKI) also 
recorded the reasons of their return (Table 5). There were 241 recorded overseas workers that 
returned home and 67.2% of them returned from Saudi Arabia. They had finished their contract 
of employment (78.01%), were taking a leave (7.47%), or returned because of a certain 
employment problem (14.52%). Compared to the previous year, the number of returning 
overseas workers of Kota Pekalongan in 2009 decreased to only 179 workers with 69.27% of 
them having worked in Saudi Arabia. The total number of returning overseas workers of the city 
in 2010 increased to 227 workers with 74.45% of them having worked in Saudi Arabia. From 
this data, there is no indication of whether those who had finished their contract of employment 
had actually reached the agreed end date or were denied continuance of employment. 
 
Table 5. The Number of Returning Overseas Workers and Their Reasons 
Reason for Returning 2008 2009 2010 Total 
Troubled 
35 21 38 94 
14.52% 11.73% 16.74% 14.53% 
On leave 
18 6 18 42 
7.47% 3.35% 7.93% 6.49% 
Had finished their contract of employment 
188 152 171 511 
78.01% 84.92% 75.33% 78.98% 
Total 241 179 227 647 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the BNP2TKI data. 
 
Besides the BNP2TKI data, the GFC Impact Survey also reveals that 41 households 
experienced the return of their members that worked as an overseas worker during the period 
of the GFC, June 2008–June 2009 (Table 6).4 Kelurahan Medono has the highest number of 
households with returning working members. Kelurahan Panjang Wetan contributes the 
lowest number, while Kelurahan Krapyak Lor has zero number of returning overseas workers.  
 
Table 6. Households with Members as Returning Overseas Workers from  
June 2008–June 2009 
Kelurahan N % 
Medono 16 39.02 
Tirto 10 24.39 
Pasirsari 12 29.27 
Krapyak Lor 0 0 
Panjang Wetan 3 7.32 
Total 41 100 
 Source: Authors’ calculation based on the GFC Impact Survey data. 
                                                          
4A qualitative study through focus group discussions with the community confirms the data with the information 
that as many as 15 Indonesian migrant workers working in countries such as Saudi Arabia came back to their 
hometown in Kelurahan Pasirsari during 2009–2010. 
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The secondary and survey data about the returning overseas workers cannot explain the 
source of the shock, i.e., whether it was due to the GFC or not. The impact of the GFC on 
the overseas workers from Kota Pekalongan was unlikely to happen since most of them 
worked as domestic workers. Regardless of the GFC, the occurrence of the return of 
household members working as overseas workers to Kota Pekalongan had affected the 
households in terms of source of income, which experienced a decline. 
 
 
 
IV. MICRO IMPACTS 
 
 
The macroeconomic data shows that Indonesia, as well as Kota Pekalongan, experienced 
economic downturn due to the GFC. However, there were other local shocks that occurred in the 
city such as the closing of a local factory due to mismanagement, shocks due to the fierce 
competition faced by the local batik industry, and the closing of a local fish trading place. The 
crises had affected the economic sector and in turn had an impact on households that depended 
on the sector as their source of income. Thus, households’ experiences and responses at any given 
moment would indicate not only effects of economic downturn but also accumulated effects of 
more localized shocks that compound the effects (Hossain and Fillaili, 2010). 
 
To understand which groups of households were affected by the compound crises during June 
2008–June 2009, a combined analysis on results of the 2009 CBMS Census and the GFC 
Impact Survey are needed. The 2009 CBMS Census is a data collection of all households in 
West and North Pekalongan. It provides information about household members’ 
characteristics and their living condition. The census does not include an instrument on 
households’ income or expenditure. As for the GFC Impact Survey, it is a survey that 
piggybacks the 2009 CBMS Census. The GFC Impact Survey is aimed to provide information 
about the impact of the crisis on the households. With a certain time frame, from June 2008 
to June 2009, the survey tries to capture the changes in the households’ livelihood 
(employment) and the socioeconomic impact of the crisis on the households (food 
consumption, healthcare, and education patterns). The survey was conducted in five kelurahan 
in Kota Pekalongan that were assumed to have been affected by the GFC. Each kelurahan 
represents the core industries with indications of the GFC impact. According to Kota 
Pekalongan’s Industry, Trade, Cooperatives, and SMEs Agency, the core industry in each 
kelurahan is as follows: batik, sarong, and other garments (Kelurahan Medono); batik 
(Kelurahan Tirto), batik (Kelurahan Pasirsari), batik (Kelurahan Krapyak Lor), and fishing and 
its products (Kelurahan Panjang Wetan). 
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Table 7. Poverty Situation in the Sample Kelurahan (%) 
Poverty Situation Medono Tirto Pasirsari 
Krapyak 
Lor 
Panjang 
Wetan 
Total households (n) 3,178 2,326 2,066 2,606 3,207 
Household head never attended or had 
not finished primary school 
13.86 13.33 22.65 17.27 17.76 
High dependency ratio (DR)
a
 6.23 4.94 5.86 7.64 5.89 
Living in a house with dirt floor 2.71 5.55 8.13 3.65 5.52 
Received the Health Insurance for the 
Poor 
18.69 23.99 38.29 22.76 36.23 
Recipient of the 2008 Unconditional Cash 
Transfer (BLT
b
 2008) 
14.85 18.7 30.88 18.23 33.61 
Recipient of Kota Pekalongan’s House 
Renovation program 
8.78 8.94 17.52 5.37 8.61 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the 2009 CBMS Census data. 
a
Households with DR > 0.5. DR is the number of household members aged below 15 years old compared to the total 
number of household members. 
b
BLT = Unconditional Cash Transfer. 
 
Table 7 shows several poverty indicators and their status as the results of the 2009 CBMS 
Census. In general, Kelurahan Pasirsari exhibits the strongest indication of poverty among the 
five kelurahan. Kota Pekalongan’s House Renovation program is a way to improve households’ 
standard of living. The basic idea is that better living condition would result in better health 
status. The local government helped to renovate the households’ houses with regard to the 
availability of toilets, protected water sources, and appropriate roofing and flooring. 
 
With a lack of income or expenditure data, the Table 7 can only show the difference in 
poverty situation among the five kelurahan without being able to indicate the households’ 
welfare status and identify the poor. We use the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
method to develop groups of households’ welfare based on the variance of the 
households’ socioeconomic background variables such as education, occupation, and 
ownership of assets.5 The variables used also include the poverty indicators shown in 
Table 7. The PCA was conducted in each kelurahan. Therefore, the household welfare is 
local specific to each kelurahan. 
 
Table 8 shows the number of households from the merged data and the number of 
households after the PCA is applied. There are 10,111 households (75,55% of the total 
households) with complete variables that can be used for the PCA. The PCA ranks each 
household in each kelurahan and splits up a set of ranked data into quintiles (five groups). It 
produces households with the lowest rank, the lowest 20% of the total households per 
kelurahan, which are indicated as the poorest. Households with the highest rank, the highest 
20% of the total households per kelurahan, are indicated as the richest. 
  
                                                          
5The PCA method develops an artificial index that can only be applied if the variables needed from each 
observation are complete. 
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Table 8. The Number of Households in the Sample Kelurahan 
Kelurahan 
Before the PCA After the PCA 
N % N % 
Medono 3,178 23.74 2,431 24.04 
Tirto 2,326 17.38 1,803 17.83 
Pasirsari 2,066 15.44 1,568 15.51 
Krapyak Lor 2,606 19.47 1,931 19.11 
Panjang Wetan 3,207 23.96 2,378 23.52 
Total 13,383 100 10,111 100 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the 2009 CBMS Census data. 
 
From those five groups, we can analyze the location of the poorest based on their neighborhood 
unit.6 Table 9 shows that in Kelurahan Medono, the poorest are mostly located in RT 3 of RW 
4, while in Kelurahan Panjang Wetan, most of the poorest live in RT 5 of RW 13. 
 
Table 9. Location of the Poorest in Each Kelurahan by RW and RT 
Kelurahan 
The Poorest (the 
Lowest 10% of 
the Total 
Households) 
RW with the Most 
Number of the Poorest in 
Each Kelurahan 
RT with the Most Number of 
the Poorest 
n  RW N RW, RT N 
Medono 486 RW 4 96 RW 4, RT 3 36 
Tirto 360 RW 5 89 RW 5, RT 3 34 
Pasirsari 313 RW 1 56 RW 1, RT 3 21 
Krapyak Lor 386 RW 1 137 RW 1, RT 5 27 
Panjang Wetan 475 RW 13 90 RW 13, RT 5 27 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the 2009 CBMS Census data. 
 
 
4.1 Impact of the Crises on Households 
 
Aside from allowing us to locate the poorest group within each kelurahan by using PCA, the 
merged data also enabled us to identify households that experienced the compound crises. Job 
switching can indicate that quite a lot of households in the kelurahan work in the informal sector 
and hence are vulnerable to economic crisis. The impact of the crises could also have affected 
the income received by households since informal workers employed in the batik industry 
worked on less square meters of mori cloth to be painted with batik patterns and dipped in dye 
and contract laborers in the garment industry worked less hours. This was also partly because 
most of the household members switched to worse jobs. 
  
                                                          
6RT, or neighborhood unit, is the smallest unit of local administration consisting of a number of households. RW 
is a unit of local administration consisting of several RT within a kelurahan. 
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Table 10. Households with Members Switching to a Worse Job during June 2008–
June 2009 by Household Welfare Quintile 
Kelurahan 
Quintile 
Missing 
Values 
Total 
1 2 3 4 5 n 
n % n % n % n % n % (100%) 
Medono 30 33.71 16 17.98 17 19.10 7 7.87 5 5.62 14 89 
Tirto 17 26.56 12 18.75 12 18.75 6 9.38 3 4.69 14 64 
Pasirsari 6 13.95 10 23.26 9 20.93 4 9.30 5 11.63 9 43 
Krapyak Lor 17 28.81 8 13.56 8 13.56 6 10.17 2 3.39 18 59 
Panjang Wetan 48 34.78 24 17.39 13 9.42 12 8.70 4 2.90 37 138 
Total 118 30.03 70 17.81 59 15.01 35 8.91 19 4.83 92 393 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the data from the 2009 CBMS Census and the GFC Impact Survey. 
 
Table 10 shows the cross tabulation of households’ welfare based on the PCA with 393 
households (2.93% of 13,383 households) switching to a worse job than the previous one. 
Across all the kelurahan, 30.03% of the households that reported to have switched to a worse 
job during June 2008–June 2009 belong to the poorest quintile. The occurrences of missing 
values are due to the incomplete data of living conditions and assets used to develop the 
wealth index in the PCA process. 
 
There were 601 households (4.49%) of the total households across all the kelurahan that 
experienced a declining income during June 2008−June 2009. Most of them are from the poorest 
group (Table 11). Both tables show that during June 2008−June 2009, the compound crises felt by 
the households had made them switch jobs and experience a decline in income. Households in the 
lowest quintile are the most affected group. 
 
Table 11. Households with Declined Income during June 2008–June 2009  
by Household Welfare Quintile 
Kelurahan 
Quintile 
Missing 
Values 
Total 
1 2 3 4 5 n 
n % n % n % n % n % (100%) 
Medono 43 33.86 22 17.32 20 15.75 9 7.09 4 3.15 29 127 
Tirto 30 31.91 18 19.15 13 13.83 7 7.45 5 5.32 21 94 
Pasirsari 14 21.54 11 16.92 12 18.46 7 10.77 4 6.15 17 65 
Krapyak Lor 20 26.32 15 19.74 14 18.42 6 7.89 3 3.95 18 76 
Panjang 
Wetan 
66 27.62 43 17.99 34 14.23 25 10.46 4 1.67 67 239 
Total 173 28.79 109 18.14 93 15.47 54 8.99 20 3.33 152 601 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the data from the 2009 CBMS Census and the GFC Impact Survey. 
 
By combining two subsets of households—one that switched jobs, particularly to the worse 
job, and another one with a declining income, we could determine the households that were 
affected by the crises. It resulted in a total of 326 affected households (2.44% of the total 
households). 
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Table 12. Characteristics of Affected Households Compared to Those of  
Non-affected Households 
Indicator Description 
Number of 
Affected 
Households 
(A) 
Percentage 
of A 
Compared 
to the Total 
Affected 
Households 
(N = 326) 
Number of 
Non-
affected 
Households 
(B) 
Percentage of 
B Compared 
to the Total 
Non-affected 
Households 
(N = 13,057) 
Kelurahan 
Medono 68 20.86 3,110 23.82 
Tirto 51 15.64 2,275 17.42 
Pasirsari 32 9.82 2,034 15.58 
Krapyak Lor 48 14.72 2,558 19.59 
Panjang Wetan 127 38.96 3,080 23.59 
Sex of household 
head 
Male 289 88.65 11,207 85.83 
Female 37 11.35 1,850 14.17 
Household head 
never attending or 
not finishing primary 
school 
Yes 69 21.17 2,131 16.32 
No 257 78.83 10,926 83.68 
Household head’s 
working sector 
Agriculture 23 7.06 748 5.73 
Industry 117 35.89 3,670 28.11 
Trade 25 7.67 1,258 9.63 
Services 96 29.45 5,581 42.74 
Receiving 
transfer 
16 4.91 573 4.39 
Others 12 3.68 415 3.18 
Missing values 37 11.35 812 6.22 
Quintile of 
households 
Quintile 1 106 32.52 1,914 14.66 
Quintile 2 53 16.26 1,970 15.09 
Quintile 3 47 14.42 1,973 15.11 
Quintile 4 29 8.90 1,994 15.27 
Quintile 5 12 3.68 2,013 15.42 
Missing values 79 24.23 3,193 24.45 
Dependency ratio of 
the household 
member aged < 15 
DR <= 0.5 296 90.80 12,265 93.93 
DR > 0.5 (high) 30 9.20 792 6.07 
Living in a house 
with dirt floor 
Yes 38 11.66 617 4.73 
No 288 88.34 12,440 95.27 
Receiving the 
Health Insurance for 
the Poor 
Yes 137 42.02 3,561 27.27 
No 189 57.98 9,496 72.73 
Receiving the 2008 
Unconditional Cash 
Transfer (BLT 2008) 
Yes 99 30.37 2,999 22.97 
No 227 69.63 10,058 77.03 
Receiving the 
House Renovation 
program 
Yes 55 16.87 1,210 9.27 
No 271 83.13 11,847 90.73 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the data from the 2009 CBMS Census and the GFC Impact Survey. 
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Table 12 shows that 21.17% of the affected households are households with a household head 
who never attended or did not finish primary school. This is higher than the proportion in the 
non-affected group (16.32%). About 35.89% of the household heads in the affected group 
work in the industrial sector. Based on the quintile, most of the affected households come 
from the poorest group (the first quintile). In the first quintile, the proportion of the affected 
households is higher than that of the non-affected households, 32.52% compared to 14.66%. 
The socioeconomic condition of the affected group is also reflected in the other indicators. 
The proportion of the affected households is higher in indicators such as living in a house 
with dirt floor, receiving the Health Insurance for the Poor, receiving the 2008 Unconditional 
Cash Transfer, and receiving the House Renovation program compared to that of the non-
affected households. 
 
 
4.2 Coping Mechanisms Adopted by Households 
 
Since the most affected group is the poorest group, we will focus on the analysis of what the 
poorest households did to cope with the crises they experienced. Some indicators that were 
assumed to be the coping mechanisms that the households adopted include:  
a) changing the food consumption pattern, 
b) changing the healthcare payment method, 
c) selling or pawning assets, 
d) having household members aged below 15 work, 
e) having household members aged 15−18 work, 
f) discontinuing the schooling of household members aged 6−15, and 
g) transferring children from private school to government school. 
 
a) Changing the food consumption pattern 
 
During June 2008–June 2009, 8.47% of the total number of households (1,134 of 13,383 
households) experienced a reduction in the quantity and quality of food consumption (Table 
13). Of the 1,134 households, 81.83% reduced their meal frequency from three times per day 
to twice per day, while 16.14% had a meal frequency reduction from twice per day to once per 
day. Some households (0.88%) had smaller portions of meals consumed, while 1.15% of the 
households had to turn to less quality foods (Table 13). 
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Table 13. Changes in Frequency and Quality of Meals by Kelurahan 
Kelurahan 
Negative Changes in Food Consumption Pattern Made by 
Households 
Total 
From 3x to 
2x 
From 2x to 
1x 
Reduced 
Quality of Food 
Reduced 
Quantity of Food 
Medono 
257 28 2 5 292 
88.01% 9.59% 0.68% 1.71% 100% 
Tirto 
142 41 9 5 197 
72.08% 20.81% 4.57% 2.54% 100% 
Pasirsari 
66 34 0 0 100 
66.00% 34.00% 0% 0% 100% 
Krapyak Lor 
238 31 2 0 271 
87. 82% 11.44% 0.74% 0% 100% 
Panjang Wetan 
225 50 0 0 274 
82.12% 17.88% 0% 0% 100% 
Total 928 183 13 10 1,134 
% 81.83% 16.14% 1.15% 0.88% 100% 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the GFC Impact Survey data. 
 
Out of 1,134 households, 115 households (35.28%) were affected, while 1,019 (7.80%) were 
non-affected households (Table 14). The majority of households changed their food 
consumption by reducing their meal frequency from three times to twice. This strategy was 
reported by 27.30% of the affected households and 6.43% of the non-affected households. 
The proportion of households reducing their frequency of meals from twice to once is higher 
in the affected households than in the non-affected households (7.36% compared to 1.22%). 
 
Table 14. Households with Negative Changes in Food Consumption Pattern during 
June 2008–June 2009 by Affected and Non-affected Groups 
Negative Changes in Food 
Consumption 
Affected Households 
(N = 326) 
Non-affected Households 
(N = 13,057) 
n % n % 
From 3x to 2x 89 27.30 839 6.43 
From 2x to 1x 24 7.36 159 1.22 
Reduced Quality of Food 2 0.61 11 0.08 
Reduced Quantity of Food 0 0 10 0.08 
Total 115 35.28 1,019 7.80 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the GFC Impact Survey data. 
 
By combining the results of the survey and the household welfare results from the PCA 
(Table 15), it turns out that the highest number of households that made negative changes to 
their food consumption pattern is in the poorest quintile/group, i.e., comprising 314 
households, or 27.69%. The number of households that made negative changes to their food 
consumption pattern due to the shocks decreases as their welfare increases. Selected changes 
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of reducing quantity of food—such as from a whole chicken to half of it—were made by the 
upper (3rd and 4th) quintiles, respectively about 20% (2 out of 10 households) and 40% (4 out 
of 10 households). 
 
Table 15. Households with Negative Changes in Food Consumption Pattern during 
June 2008–June 2009 by Household Welfare Quintile 
Negative Changes in 
Food Consumption 
Pattern 
Quintile 
Total 1 2 3 4 5 
n % n % n % n % n % 
From 3x to 2x 251 27.05 158 17.03 121 13.04 85 9.16 58 6.25 928 
From 2x to 1x 61 33.33 33 18.03 25 13.66 7 3.83 4 2.19 183 
Reduced Quality of Food 1 7.69 3 23.08 2 15.38 3 23.08 3 23.08 13 
Reduced Quantity of 
Food 
1 10 1 10 2 20 4 40 0 0 10 
Total 314 27.69 195 17.2 150 13.23 99 8.73 65 5.73 1,134 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the data from the 2009 CBMS Census and the GFC Impact Survey. 
 
b) Changing the healthcare payment method 
 
Between June 2008 and June 2009, there were 647 households (4.83% of the total households) 
that changed their healthcare pattern (Table 16). The highest number of households that 
changed their healthcare pattern is in Kelurahan Pasirsari. When this data is combined with the 
household welfare data based on the PCA, it does not give a clear pattern to determine whether 
the changes mean that the households’ financial ability becomes less or not. It is possible that 
the changes in the access to healthcare occur because the households are forced to deal with a 
serious illness and hence change to advanced healthcare treatment. About 40% of 647 
households across all the kelurahan that previously used the services of private midwives, private 
practices, and government hospitals had changed their preference and currently use the 
community health center (puskesmas) as their healthcare provider. 
 
Table 16. The Number of Households Changing Healthcare Pattern and  
Payment Method 
Kelurahan 
Changes in Healthcare Pattern Changes in Payment Method 
n % n % 
Medono 156 24.11 66 17.98 
Tirto 59 9.12 15 4.09 
Pasirsari 196 30.29 139 37.87 
Krapyak Lor 125 19.32 40 10.9 
Panjang Wetan 111 17.16 107 29.16 
Total 647 100 367 100 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the GFC Impact Survey data. 
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Table 17. Household Changes in Healthcare Payment Method during June 2008–
June 2009 by Affected and Non-affected Groups 
Payment Method 
Affected 
Households (N = 
326) 
Non-affected 
Households (N = 
13,057) 
Past Current n % n % 
Personal pocket 
Health insurance 3 0.92 30 0.23 
Health Insurance for the Poor 15 4.60 195 1.49 
Reimbursement from the company 0 0 11 0.08 
Loan 4 1.23 42 0.32 
Health insurance 
Personal pocket 0 0 13 0.10 
Health Insurance for the Poor 0 0 3 0.02 
Loan 0 0 2 0.02 
Health Insurance for 
the Poor 
Personal pocket 2 0.61 33 0.25 
Health insurance 0 0 1 0.01 
Loan 0 0 2 0.02 
Reimbursement 
from  the company 
Personal pocket 1 0.31 5 0.04 
Health Insurance for the Poor 0 0 1 0.01 
Loan Personal pocket 0 0 4 0.03 
Total 25 7.67 342 2.62 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the data from the 2009 CBMS Census and the GFC Impact Survey. 
 
Moreover, 367 of 13,383 households (2.74%) experienced a change in the payment for 
healthcare services, while others did not. Twenty-five out of 367 households (6.81%) are from 
the affected households (Table 17). The percentage of non-affected households is about 
93.19% (342 out of 367 households). 
 
The negative changes that households made to cope with the crises were concentrated in the 
change of payment method from using their personal fund to using the Health Insurance for 
the Poor, which existed in both categories, the affected households (4.60%) and non-affected 
households (1.49%). The incidence of this change in the affected households was slightly 
higher. The change of payment method from using personal fund to obtaining a loan 
(borrowing money) was the second most selected change by the affected households (1.23%) 
and non-affected households (0.32%). 
 
Table 18 shows that 66 of 367 households (18%) across all the kelurahan that made some 
changes in the payment of healthcare during June 2008–June 2009 are from the poorest 
group. For starters, these households reduced their health expenses by using the Health 
Insurance for the Poor. They also borrowed money when it was not enough or when they 
were not eligible to receive the health insurance. The proportion of households changing their 
healthcare payment from using personal fund to obtaining a loan is 19.6% (9 out of 46 
households) in the 3rd quintile, the highest percentage among all the quintiles. The fact that 
households in the highest quintile had access to the Health Insurance for the Poor indicates an 
inclusion error of the social protection program. 
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Table 18. Household Changes in Healthcare Payment Method during  
June 2008–June 2009 by Household Welfare Quintile 
Payment Method Quintile 
Total 
Past Current 
1 2 3 4 5 
n % n % n % n % n % 
Personal 
pocket 
Health insurance 3 9.1 3 9.1 5 15.2 2 6.1 9 27.3 33 
Health Insurance 
for the Poor 
49 23.3 38 18.1 37 17.6 25 11.9 5 2.4 210 
Reimbursement 
from the Company 
0 0 0 0 2 18.2 3 27.3 5 45.5 11 
Loan 7 15.2 7 15.2 9 19.6 4 8.7 2 4.3 46 
Health 
insurance 
Personal pocket 0 0 2 15.4 3 23.1 3 23.1 2 15.4 13 
Health Insurance 
for the Poor 
0 0 1 33.3 0 0 1 33.3 0 0 3 
Loan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Health 
Insurance for 
the Poor 
Personal pocket 4 11.4 7 20 5 14.3 7 20.0 1 2.9 35 
Health insurance 1 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Loan 1 50 0 0 1 50 0 0 0 0 2 
Reimbursement 
from the 
company 
Personal pocket 0 0 0 0 1 16.7 1 16.7 2 33.3 6 
Health Insurance 
for the Poor 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 100 1 
Loan Personal pocket 1 25 1 25 2 50 0 0 0 0 4 
Total 66 18 59 16.1 65 17.7 46 12.5 27 7.4 367 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the data from the 2009 CBMS Census and the GFC Impact Survey. 
 
Positive changes in healthcare payment are shown by the incidences of using health insurance 
and reimbursement facility from the company during the current period. However, the 
proportion of these changes is the highest in the 5th quintile, respectively 27.3% (9 of 33 
households) and 45.5% (5 of 11 households). 
 
c) Pawning or selling assets 
 
During June 2008–June 2009, 1,599 households (11.94% of 13,383 households) sold or 
pawned their assets (livestock, motorcycle, land, poultry, etc.). There were 144 (out of 326) 
affected households, or 0.44%, that adopted this coping strategy, while 1,455 (out of 13,057) 
non-affected households, or 11.14%, did the same thing. 
 
The reasons for pawning or selling assets are categorized based on the sample households’ 
statements. We have divided them into general/unspecified reasons and specific reasons. The 
general/unspecified reasons include the following: earning an inadequate salary, not having 
money, meeting an urgent need, not wanting to borrow money from others, and having no 
idea what another household member had used the money obtained from pawning or selling 
an asset for. The specific reasons for pawning or selling an asset include to meet the 
household’s daily needs, to pay the children’s school fee, to pay the family’s debt, etc. 
  
The SMERU Research Institute 21 
Table 19. Households Pawning or Selling Their Assets during June 2008–June 2009 
by Affected and Non-affected Groups 
Reason for Pawning or Selling an Asset 
Affected Households 
(N = 326) 
Non-affected 
Households 
(N = 13,057) 
n % n % 
To meet a daily need                   66 0.20 575 4.40 
To pay the school fee               14 0.04 111 0.85 
To pay a debt                     10 0.03 72 0.55 
To pay a health expense              5 0.02 62 0.47 
To obtain business capital         2 0.01 59 0.45 
To get a job                 2 0.01 22 0.17 
To meet daily and school needs        1 0.003 22 0.17 
To renovate the house            0 0 14 0.11 
To meet a daily need & obtain business capital  0 0 10 0.08 
To celebrate a family occasion          0 0 7 0.05 
To meet a secondary need               0 0 5 0.04 
To pay a debt & school needs        1 0.003 3 0.02 
To pay a debt & meet a daily need         1 0.003 2 0.02 
To meet a school need & obtain business capital 1 0.003 2 0.02 
Earning an inadequate salary         1 0.003 13 0.10 
Not having money           7 0.02 72 0.55 
Meeting an urgent need                  1 0.00 85 0.65 
Not wanting to borrow money from others      1 0.003 1 0.01 
Others                       0 0 12 0.09 
No idea                  31 0.10 306 2.34 
Total 144 0.44 1,455 11.14 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the GFC Impact Survey data. 
 
The percentage of households that used money from pawning or selling assets to fulfill daily 
needs is high in both groups. However, the proportion is higher for the non-affected 
households, 4.40%, compared to 0.20% for the affected households (Table 19). The affected 
households also adopted this coping strategy to pay their children’s school expenses and their 
debts. Some reasons for pawning or selling assets such as to renovate their house, to celebrate a 
family occasion, and to meet a secondary need were revealed by the non-affected households. 
 
A cross tabulation of reasons for pawning or selling assets and households’ welfare gives an 
explanation about which groups make use of pawning or selling assets as their coping mechanism. 
Although the majority of the households come from the first quintile or the poorest group 
(22.89%), it appears across quintiles (Table 20). Several reasons such as to fulfill daily needs, to pay 
the children’s school expenses, to pay a debt, and to pay health expenses emerged among the 
poorest households. Households in the fourth and fifth quintiles admitted that they pawned or 
sold their assets to increase their business capital, respectively 31.15% and 22.95%. Another reason 
for pawning or selling assets was to get a job. Possibilities of why this reason occurred include to 
win a competition for a job position in a private or public institution or to buy off an official to get 
an overseas worker’s license. However, there is no further explanation for this kind of reason.  
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Table 20. Households Pawning or Selling Their Assets during June 2008–June 2009 
by Household Welfare Quintile 
Reason for Pawning 
or Selling an Asset 
Quintile 
Total 1 2 3 4 5 
n % n % n % n % n % 
To meet a daily need 191 29.80 131 20.44 105 16.38 62 9.67 23 3.59 641 
To pay the school fee 25 20 23 18.4 25 20 22 17.6 9 7.2 125 
To pay a debt  19 23.17 12 14.63 10 12.20 13 15.85 8 9.76 82 
To pay a health 
expense 
14 20.90 9 13.43 9 13.43 9 13.43 9 13.43 67 
To obtain business 
capital  
2 3.28 8 13.11 7 11.48 19 31.15 14 22.95 61 
To get a job  8 33.33 7 29.17 0 0 2 8.33 1 4.17 24 
To meet daily and 
school needs 
8 34.78 2 8.70 4 17.39 4 17.39 0 0 23 
To renovate the house  2 14.29 4 28.57 1 7.14 2 14.29 4 28.57 14 
To meet a daily need & 
obtain business capital  
0 0 5 50 1 10 1 10 1 10 10 
To celebrate a family 
occasion 
1 14.29 1 14.29 2 28.57 1 14.29 0 0 7 
To meet a secondary 
need  
0 0 0 0 1 20 2 40 1 20 5 
To pay a debt & school 
needs  
1 25 1 25 0 0 2 50 0 0 4 
To pay a debt & meet a 
daily need 
1 33.33 0 0 0 0 1 33.33 1 33.33 3 
To meet a school need 
& obtain business 
capital 
0 0 0 0 1 33.33 0 0 1 33.33 3 
Earning an inadequate 
salary 
1 7.14 4 28.57 4 28.57 0 0 1 7.14 14 
Not having money  11 13.92 19 24.05 19 24.05 9 11.39 6 7.59 79 
Meeting an urgent need  10 11.63 11 12.79 15 17.44 19 22.09 12 13.95 86 
Not wanting to borrow 
money from others  
1 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Others  0 0 0 0 4 33.33 5 41.67 1 8.33 12 
No idea 71 21.07 70 20.77 47 13.95 37 10.98 35 10.39 337 
Total 366 22.89 307 19.20 255 15.95 210 13.13 127 7.94 1599 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the data from the 2009 CBMS Census and the GFC Impact Survey. 
 
d) Having household members aged below 15 work 
 
For a definite analysis, the merged data from the 2009 CBMS Census and the GFC Impact 
Survey is also used as a cross-checking condition. We also use minimum age to limit the 
analysis. The minimum age recorded for child labor according to Statistics Indonesia is 10 
years old. Based on the survey, there were 467 households with household members below 15 
who started working. By applying the minimum age of 10 to the household data, there were 
234 households that genuinely had household members aged 10−14 and started working. 
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The households with children aged 10−14 that started working come from both the affected 
households and the non-affected households, respectively 14 households, or 4.29% of the total 
affected households and 220 households, or 1.68% of the total non-affected households (Table 
21). The proportion of households with two children that started working is slightly higher in 
the affected households than in the non-affected households, 0.92% compared to 0.27%. 
 
Table 21. Households with Children Aged 10−14 Years Old That Started Working 
during June 2008–June 2009 by Affected and Non-affected Groups 
The Number of Children Aged 10−14 
Years Old in a Household That 
Started Working 
Affected Households 
(N = 326) 
Non-affected Households 
(N = 13,057) 
n % n % 
1 11 3.37 183 1.40 
2 3 0.92 35 0.27 
3 0 0 2 0.02 
Total 14 4.29 220 1.68 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the GFC Impact Survey data. 
 
Table 22 shows the combination between the 234 households and the household welfare 
based on the PCA. Once more, the majority of the households with at least one child that 
started working belong to the poorest quintile (68 out of 234 households, or 29.06%). The 
proportion of households with at least one child that started working decreases as their 
welfare increases. 
 
Table 22. Households with Children Aged 10−14 Years Old That Started Working 
during June 2008–June 2009 by Household Welfare Quintile 
The Number of Children 
Aged 10−14 Years Old That 
Started Working  
Quintile 
Total 1 2 3 4 5 
n % n % n % n % n % 
1 56 28.87 45 23.20 30 15.46 22 11.34 3 1.55 194 
2 12 31.58 10 26.32 5 13.16 3 7.89 0 0 38 
3 0 0 0 0 1 50 1 50 0 0 2 
Total 68 29.06 55 23.50 36 15.38 26 11.11 3 1.28 234 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the data from the 2009 CBMS Census and the GFC Impact Survey. 
 
e) Having household members aged 15−18 work 
 
Between June 2008 and June 2009, there were more household members aged 15–18 that 
started working than those aged below 15. Based on the 2009 CBMS Census, a total of 677 
households had household members aged 15−18 that had started working. Twenty-five 
households (7.67%) were from the affected households, which means that as households 
faced a decline in income during the crises, they needed assistance from younger household 
members to generate income or help the parents in generating income (Table 23). The 
proportion of households with one child aged 15−18 years old that started working is quite 
high in the affected group, 6.13% compared to 3.96% in the non-affected group. 
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Table 23. Households with Children Aged 15−18 Years Old That Started Working 
during June 2008–June 2009 by Affected and Non-affected Groups 
The Number of Children Aged 15−18 
Years Old in a Household That Started 
Working  
Affected Households (N = 
326) 
Non-affected Households (N 
= 13,057) 
n % n % 
1 20 6.13 517 3.96 
2 5 1.53 117 0.90 
3 0 0 18 0.14 
Total 25 7.67 652 4.99 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the GFC Impact Survey data. 
 
Table 24 shows that 181 of 677 households (26.74%) with children aged 15−18 years old that 
started working come from the poorest group. On average, households in the bottom three 
quintiles, middle to poor, suffered more difficulties due to the compound crises that forced 
their children aged 15−18 years old to work since their number is higher than what the two 
upper quintiles recorded. 
 
Table 24. Households with Children Aged 15−18 Years Old That Started Working 
during June 2008–June 2009 by Household Welfare Quintile  
The Number of Children 
Aged 15−18 Years Old 
That Started Working 
Quintile 
Total 1 2 3 4 5 
n % n % n % n % n % 
1 138 25.70 118 21.97 95 17.69 44 8.19 11 2.05 537 
2 39 31.97 34 27.87 17 13.93 12 9.84 1 0.82 122 
3 4 22.22 5 27.78 4 22.22 2 11.11 0 0 18 
Total 181 26.74 157 23.19 116 17.13 58 8.57 12 1.77 677 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the data from the 2009 CBMS Census and the GFC Impact Survey. 
 
f) Discontinuing the schooling of household members aged 6−15 
 
During the crisis period, June 2008–June 2009, there was an indication of households 
discontinuing their children’s education. They did this to cope with the crises as their financial 
ability had decreased. There were 121 households with children aged 6−15 years old that 
dropped out of school (Table 25). Ten households (3.07%) were from the affected group, 
while the 111 households (0.85%) were from the non-affected group. The proportion of 
households with dropout children at the junior high school level was slightly higher in the 
affected group than in the non-affected group, 1.23% compared to 0.31%. There were 5 out 
of 69 households from the non-affected group that showed an indication of having more than 
one child that dropped out of school. These households had children that dropped out of 
primary and junior high schools. 
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Table 25. Households with Dropout Children Aged 6−15 Years Old during  
June 2008–June 2009 by Affected and Non-affected Groups 
Education Level of 
Dropout Children 
Affected Households 
(N = 326) 
Non-affected Households (N = 
13,057) 
n % n % 
Primary school 6 1.84 69 0.53 
Junior high school 4 1.23 41 0.31 
Senior high school 0 0 1 0.01 
Total 10 3.07 111 0.85 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the GFC Impact Survey data. 
 
The highest proportion of households with children that dropped out of primary school is in the 
first quintile, i.e., 28 out of 75 households (37.33%) (Table 26). There is one household in the 
second quintile with a child aged 6−15 years old that dropped out of senior high school. 
Considering the age range (6−15), it is possible that the child dropped out in the first year of 
senior high school. There is no household in the fifth quintile that discontinues their child’s 
education, as their welfare level is the highest among all the quintiles. 
 
Table 26. Households with Dropout Children Aged 6−15 Years during  
June 2008–June 2009 by Household Welfare Quintile 
Education Level of 
Dropout Children 
Quintile 
Total 1 2 3 4 5 
n % n % n % n % n % 
Primary school 28 37.33 15 20 8 10.67 4 5.33 0 0 75 
Junior high school 14 31.11 9 20 4 8.89 6 13.33 0 0 45 
Senior high school 0 0 1 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Total 42 34.71 25 20.66 12 9.92 10 8.26 0 0 121 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the data from the 2009 CBMS Census and the GFC Impact Survey. 
 
g) Transferring children from private school to government school 
 
Another coping mechanism which we assumed that households would adopt when dealing with 
the crisis was transferring their children from private school to government school due to the fact 
that the school fees in government schools (primary and junior schools) are subsidized. There is 
no difference in the proportion of households with children withdrawn from private school and 
transferred to government school in the affected and non-affected household groups, both with 
the proportion of 0.31% (Table 27). 
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Table 27. Households with Children Aged 6−15 Years Old Transferred from Private 
to Government School during June 2008–June 2009 by Affected and  
Non-affected Groups 
Was There a Child Aged 6−15 Years Old in the 
Household  That Was Transferred from Private 
to Government School? 
Affected Households 
(N = 326) 
Non-affected Households 
(N = 13,057) 
n % n % 
Yes 1 0.31 40 0.31 
No 325 99.69 13,017 99.69 
Total 326 100  13,057  100 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the GFC Impact Survey data. 
 
Adding to the analysis based on household quintile, it shows that the majority of the 
households that transferred their children from private to government schools come from 
the two upper quintiles (Table 28). This instrument is a weak indicator since there are other 
possible reasons for the withdrawal of children from the private school, for example, the 
failure of the children in achieving good grades in the school, which could not be explored 
through the survey’s instruments.  
 
Table 28. Households with Children Aged 6−15 Years Old Transferred from Private 
to Government School during June 2008–June 2009 by Household Welfare Quintile 
Quintile 
Households with Children Aged 6−15 Years Old That Were Transferred 
from Private to Government School 
n % 
1 5 12.20 
2 7 17.07 
3 6 14.63 
4 10 24.39 
5 10 24.39 
Missing Values 3 7.32 
Total 41 100 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the data from the 2009 CBMS Census and the GFC Impact Survey. 
 
 
 
V. POLICY RESPONSE TO THE GFC IMPACT 
 
 
As a response to the economic downturn that occurred in the fourth quarter of 2008 due to 
the GFC’s impact, the GoI proposed to the parliament for the approval of the Fiscal Stimulus 
Package (FSP). The FSP aimed to (i) maintain the people’s purchasing power, (ii) maintain the 
stability of the business climate, and (iii) create job opportunities and absorb laid-off laborers. 
 
To fulfill the first objective, the GoI provided incentives such as reducing individual income 
tax, increasing the minimum limit of non-taxable income, and giving various subsidies. For the 
second objective, the GoI gave the business sector tax incentives as well as various subsidies. 
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The third objective was accomplished through allocating the FSP fund for labor-intensive 
projects in infrastructure and the extension of the National Program for Community 
Empowerment (PNPM). 
 
The GoI allocated Rp73.3 trillion for the FSP fund, which is about 1.4% of the 2009 GDP. 
The FSP fund was allocated to all provinces across Indonesia, but only several districts/cities 
in each province received the fund. The usage of this fund was determined by the GoI 
whether it was supposed to be used for building new infrastructure or restoring the existing 
infrastructure. 
 
According to Hastuti et al. (2011), the FSP fund was not allocated based on affected area, as 
the data on the GFC’s impact across regions was not available. Therefore, it was allocated 
based on deprived area, economic zone, political decision, etc. Although the project was 
aimed to absorb laid-off laborers, there were no practices of or regulations about using laid-off 
local laborers. 
 
Kota Pekalongan received about Rp1.933 billion of FSP fund sourced from the national 
budget through the Deconcentration and Co-administration Fund allocation mechanism at the 
district/city level. However, there is no further information about the use of the FSP fund in 
Kota Pekalongan. 
 
Based on the GFC Impact Survey, the observed time frame of the GFC’s impact on households was 
from June 2008–June 2009, while the utilization of the FSP fund started from the beginning of 
August 2009 (Hastuti et al., 2011). Therefore, the survey was unable to capture the results of the 
GoI’s mitigation strategy as a response to the GFC impact. Since the mitigation strategy was not 
targeted to recipients such as the batik home industry and the fishing industry, it is difficult to 
observe the outcome. 
 
Still according to the GFC Impact Survey data, 2,161 households stated that they had been the 
recipients of several special aid programs in relation to the global financial crisis. The data also 
provides information about the source of the aid, i.e., the government, private and religious 
institutions, and mass organizations. The analysis will be focused on the aid programs 
implemented by the government, regardless of whether they come from the central 
government or Kota Pekalongan itself (Table 29). 
 
Table 29 shows that 310 households had received capital loan and 598 households received capital 
goods from the government. However, the data does not say whether the capital loan and goods 
received by the households had come from the government in the specific form of PNPM or not. 
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Table 29. Households That Are Recipients of Government-Sponsored  
Special Aid Programs 
Form of Aid Medono Tirto Pasirsari 
Krapyak 
Lor 
Panjang 
Wetan 
Total  
Capital loan  
32 109 19 22 128 310 
14.10 27.59 8.72 6.49 13.03 14.35 
Capital goods 
30 80 62 33 393 598 
13.22 20.25 28.44 9.73 40.02 27.67 
Others  
157 191 135 280 457 1,220 
69.16 48.35 61.93 82.60 46.54 56.46 
Do not know 
8 15 2 4 4 33 
3.52 3.80 0.92 1.18 0.41 1.53 
Total 
227 395 218 339 982 2,161 
100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the GFC Impact Survey data. 
 
Besides responding specifically to the GFC impact, the GoI also spent about Rp200,000 times 
18.2 million poor households across Indonesia in the form of Unconditional Cash Transfer 2009 
(BLT 2009) funds. The targeted households in 2009 were the same as those that received BLT 
2008 funds since the database used was the same, the PPLS08.7 According to a local newspaper, 
Suara Pantura (2009), there were 22,983 households in Kota Pekalongan that received BLT 2009 
funds. The distribution of the funds in the city was conducted on 20−27 April 2009. 
 
The 2009 CBMS Census did not include a question that could determine which households 
received BLT 2009 funds. However, the GFC Impact Survey was able to capture the 
information about the households that received BLT funds during June 2008–June 2009. The 
‘Others’ category of special aids in Table 29 reveals that 1,220 households were the recipients of 
BLT 2009, Rice for the Poor (Raskin), Health Insurance for the Poor (Jamkesmas), School 
Operational Assistance (BOS), and the House Renovation program. 
 
Table 30. Households Receiving the Unconditional Cash Transfer during  
June 2008–June 2009 by Affected and Non-affected Groups 
Kelurahan 
Affected Households 
(N = 326) 
Non-affected Households (N = 
13,057) 
n % n % 
Krapyak Lor 1 0.31 131 1.00 
Medono 3 0.92 113 0.87 
Panjang Wetan  21 6.44 261 2.00 
Pasirsari 4 1.23 119 0.91 
Tirto 7 2.15 146 1.12 
Total 36 11.04 770 5.90 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the GFC Impact Survey data. 
                                                          
7PPLS08 is a database of targeted households for the GoI’s social protection programs. The data was collected by 
Statistics Indonesia through a survey called Pendataan Program Perlindungan Sosial 2008, or the 2008 Data 
Collection for Social Protection Programs. 
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There are 806 households who admitted that they had received BLT 2009 funds (Table 30). These 
households comprise 36 households of the total affected households, or 11.04%, and 770 
households of the total non-affected households, or 5.90%. The majority of the affected 
households that received BLT 2009 funds lived in Kelurahan Panjang Wetan. 
 
A cross tabulation between households receiving BLT 2009 funds and the household welfare 
from the PCA method results in a description of the recipients (Table 31). The poorest group 
has the highest number of households which received BLT 2009 funds, 229 households out of 
the total 806 households (28.41%). The fact that households in the highest quintile received 
BLT 2009 funds indicates an inclusion error of the social protection program or incorrectness 
in the PCA process. 
 
Table 31. Households Receiving the Unconditional Cash Transfer during June 
2008–June 2009 by Household Welfare Quintile 
Kelurahan 
Quintile 
Total 1 2 3 4 5 
n % n % n % n % n % 
Krapyak Lor 36 27.27 33 25.00 11 8.33 1 0.76 0 0 132 
Medono 35 30.17 25 21.55 12 10.34 0 0 1 0.86 116 
Panjang Wetan  71 25.18 46 16.31 39 13.83 28 9.93 0 0 282 
Pasirsari 33 26.83 14 11.38 17 13.82 9 7.32 1 0.81 123 
Tirto 54 35.29 25 16.34 17 11.11 3 1.96 0 0 153 
Total 229 28.41 143 17.74 96 11.91 41 5.09 2 0.25 806 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the data from the 2009 CBMS Census and the GFC Impact Survey. 
 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
 
Through this study, we sought to ascertain the indication of the GFC’s impact in Kota 
Pekalongan at the macro- and microeconomic levels. The two main economic sectors in Kota 
Pekalongan were affected by the GFC’s impact. The textile/batik industries were affected 
through their weakened export demands and the increasing price of the imported cotton. The 
fishing industry was also affected by the weakened export demands. During the period of the 
GFC, other crises took place in the local setting such as the closing of a garment factory due 
to mismanagement and family conflict, the intense rivalry with another competitor in the batik 
industry, and the closing of the local fishers’ trading place. However, there was no indication 
of the GFC’s impact in the return of Kota Pekalongan’s overseas workers who mostly work as 
domestic workers. These shocks had accumulated and were difficult to be set apart at the 
micro level, which resulted in compound crises experienced by the households. 
 
This study represents the first attempt to use the merged data of the 2009 CBMS Census and 
the GFC Impact Survey in five kelurahan in Kota Pekalongan. It gives more information 
needed for identifying the affected groups of households, particularly when the PCA method 
has been applied to the data. 
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The 326 affected households were identified through incidences of household members 
switching jobs, particularly to a worse job, and the decline in income during June 2008−June 
2009. Based on household characteristics, the affected households are households with a head 
of household that never attended or did not finish primary school, works in the industrial 
sector, comes from the poorest group (the first quintile), lives in a house with dirt floor, and 
has received several social protection programs from the government. Based on the quintile, it 
appears that the poorest group, or the lowest quintile, has the highest number of affected 
households. 
 
In regard to the crises, the households utilized several coping strategies, such as changing their 
food consumption pattern, changing their healthcare payment method, pawning or selling 
their assets, and driving their children to enter the labor force and thus to drop out of school. 
Once again, the majority of the households employing these strategies come from the poorest 
group. 
 
The GoI needs to have a good database of targeted households, as the social protection 
programs have proven to have eased the poor households in times of crisis. These households 
used the Health Insurance for the Poor and BLT 2009 programs as their safety nets when they 
do not have any other financial assistance. An early response system requires a good database 
that can support immediate actions from the government in handling any crisis. Infrastructure 
projects from the FSP fund are less likely to reach the targeted households since there is no 
regulation that prioritizes the poor. The government’s awareness on vulnerable economic 
sectors, on which many households rely, is also important, besides the importance of 
performing a preventive action in the form of giving incentives to industries in times of crisis. 
The local governments should initiate the provision of databases of vulnerable economic 
sectors and targeted households at their own cost, such as Kota Pekalongan’s household data 
collected through the CBMS project conducted in the city. 
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